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Redevelopment Is Back in California

Back in 2011, Governor Jerry Brown abolished redevelopment agencies in California successfully gaining $1.5 billion of the redevelopment funding to close California’s budget gap. Recently, three bills have reached the Governor’s office in an attempt to revive redevelopment in California. Gov. Brown has signed two of those bills, Senate Bill 628 and Assembly Bill 229, into law while vetoing Assembly Bill 2280.

SB 628 will create what redevelopment revivalists call Enhanced Infrastructure Financing Districts, which essentially is redevelopment on a bigger scale, without protections. Old redevelopment law required a city to deem a certain area as blighted, meaning inhabiting the area would be dangerous and against public safety. The new law under SB 628 does not require a finding of blight. Opponents to the bill argue that the new law will make eminent domain abuse much easier to get away with. EIFD also will change the threshold for voter approval from two-thirds to only 55%, a lowered threshold from standard infrastructure finance districts. Furthermore, opponents fear that the new law will give city officials the right to take private property from downtown areas which will decrease or eliminate low-income housing. The new law, unlike the standard IFD, does not require cities to set aside funding for low-income housing.

AB 229 is another form of redevelopment law that targets the revitalization of old military bases. Known as the Infrastructure and Revitalization Financing District (IRFD), this bill can issue 30 years of debt with a 2/3 voter approval in the district. Opponents argue that the IRFD is granting city officials great power over private property, unrestricted power of eminent domain and the ability to fund private party projects with state tax money.

The only bill vetoed by Brown was AB 2280. This bill, known as Community Revitalization and Investment Authority (CRIA), would allow local governments to create CRIA in areas of the city facing disadvantages for funding community specified activities. It would also have revived tax-increment financing which sets aside 25% for affordable, low-income housing. Brown’s veto message stated that, if approved, the bill would “unnecessarily vest this new program in redevelopment law.” However, he did also mention his desire to work with the bill writers to come to a possible consensus on tax-increment financing for disadvantage areas.

Regardless of opposition, redevelopment appears to be back with little or no restrictions on the power to take private property by city and state officials. When the passed bills were showcased, their focus was funding for upgrading roads, sewer pipes, and levees. But it will be interesting to see how far the new law will stretch the definition of “infrastructure.”


By: A.J. Hazarabedian

To learn more about A.J. Hazarabedian, the managing partner at California Eminent Domain Law Group, visit

Studio City Residents and Community Groups Seek to Stop Property Owner’s Redevelopment Plains: Open Space vs. Condos

Open Space vs. Condos

Proposed development of a portion of the privately-owned 17 acre Weddington Golf and Tennis, located on the banks of the Los Angeles River in Studio City, is a hot topic of debate between Studio City residents and the Weddington owners. The public golf and tennis facilities have been a neighborhood gem for many years providing rare open space within the densely developed neighborhood.

In 2008, the Weddingtons submitted a development proposal to the City of Los Angeles for a 200-unit senior housing condominium complex where the tennis courts are presently located. The proposed development would include six four-story buildings and 635 parking spaces. In July, a Draft Environmental Impact Report for the Project was issued for review and comment. Currently, the Weddingtons are preparing for the development by lobbying for necessary development approvals, including a requested change in zoning from agricultural to multi-family residential.

While the Weddingtons seek to develop part of their property, and generate income, local residents want the property to remain as open space.

This debate brings to light the often conflicting interests of the public and a private property owner.

The Community’s Perspective

The surrounding community would prefer that the Weddington Golf & Tennis facilities remain as open space available to the public. Although it is private property, opponents of development argue Weddington Golf & Tennis is a community amenity similar to public parks and designated open spaces. As it has been there for many years, the property has become an established community fixture. Now, the community has a vested interest in its future and views the property as a key feature of the community.

Because the property has become like a public park, some argue that the simple answer is for the City to simply purchase it and permanently establish it as a public park.  This, however, would come at a substantial cost: Councilman Paul Krekorian, who represents the area and is opposed to the project, has attempted to find funding for the City to buy the land from the Weddingtons, possibly resorting to the use of eminent domain. So far, his attempts to secure the $20 to $30 million necessary to purchase the land have failed. Unless the Weddingtons are willing to donate the land, or accept a steep discount, this scenario does not appear likely.

Since the community is opposed to development of the site, can the City simply prevent the Weddingtons from building 200 condominiums on their private property? To answer briefly, possibly. However, the explanation is multi-faceted and the line between government’s reasonable regulation of private land use (called the “police power”) and government’s regulation effectively taking private property (“eminent domain”) is not always clear.

Because development of the Weddington’s private property requires development approvals, the City does have the ability to deny outright, or limit, the Weddingtons proposal for the condominiums. There is an established development process that the City and Weddington are following, including a public review and consideration of the proposed Project. This process allows the community to voice its concerns about the Project and its potential impacts. As long as the process is followed, the City’s ultimate determination – granting or denying development approvals – would probably be technically legally valid.

As a property owner, though, the Weddingtons are permitted to use their property in an economically viable manner– including potentially the right to change the use of their property. What are the incentives for the City to stop the Weddingtons from developing their property as proposed? The public’s dissatisfaction with the Project may influence City officials to side for open space and preserve access to the LA River.  The Weddingtons, however, would probably be entitled to develop their property to some extent – which would probably result in the elimination of some of the existing recreational facilities.

Studio City Residents Association and Save LA River Open Space have submitted their own development impact report to the City outlining impacts of the Project, one of which is the destruction of what they characterize as “rare, irreplaceable open space.” Their intentions are to keep the area open and convert it to the Los Angeles River Natural Park which would include the existing tennis courts and golf course.

The Property Owner’s Point of View 

The Weddington’s have the right to use their private property in an economically viable way. The fact that they have opened their property to the public for many years, and provided an important recreational facility to the community, does not negate their rights as private property owners. One of the most important elements of American society is the concept of strong private property rights and a mechanism for upholding those rights.

Economist Armen A. Alchian does not differentiate between property rights and human rights stating “property rights are human rights.” Private property rights are protected under the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, “…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation” and Article 1, Section 19 of the California Constitution, “Private property may be taken or damaged for a public use only when just compensation … has first been paid to … the owner.”

Private property rights are often described as a bundle of rights – including the right to exclude others from your property. Another aspect of property rights is the “exclusive authority” to determine how to use that property. However, the phrase “exclusive authority” is subject to the “police powers” of the government. This means that the government can reasonably regulate such things as one’s use of their private property in the interest of the public health and safety. In this situation, the City’s has some discretion regarding the use of the Weddington property under its “police power.”

Many residents say they relied on the open space and recreational facilities of the area – including Weddington Golf & Tennis – when purchasing their homes in the Studio City neighborhood.

Is a homeowner’s reliance enough to trump private property rights? Generally, the answer is no. Should it matter that the Weddington’s property is privately owned and is not permanently committed as open space like a public park? Of course it should. The City must also consider the potential public benefits of development of the property as proposed – including significant property tax revenues.

Is There A Possible Compromise

Absent some form of compromise, or the City’s outright acquisition of the property, only one perspective is likely to win out. Or, is there a win-win solution in which both the interests of the public and the property owner are served? If so, both sides would need to compromise – with some open space being preserved, and some development allowed. This may not be palatable to either side – but often the best compromise is one in which both sides are equally unhappy.


By: Glenn L. Block, Esq.
To learn more about Glenn L. Block, partner at California Eminent Domain Law Group, visit

Tug-of-War for Martins Beach Access: Possible Eminent Domain Case

martinConflict between Simi Valley billionaire Vinod Khosla and those seeking public access to Martins Beach will make its way to Gov. Jerry Brown. Last week the state Senate approved Senate Bill 968 which, in essence, requires the State Land Commission to negotiate with Khosla to acquire public access to his private property.

Khosla purchased the 87 acre coastal property in 2008 and, like prior owners of the property, he allowed public access to the road which leads to Martins Beach until 2010. Since then, Khosla has advised his property manager to block the gate which leads to Martins Beach Road.
If signed by Gov. Brown, the bill, written by Sen. Jerry Hill, D-San Mateo, requires that the State Land Commission negotiate with Khosla in an attempt to purchase an easement on his property. If negotiations fail and a compromise is not reached by January 1, 2016, the bill will authorize the power of the State Land Commission to use eminent domain to acquire the easement by providing just compensation for the property.

Earlier this month the bill passed the full Assembly, then was returned to the Senate where it was passed and is now awaiting Gov. Brown’s signature. Even if signed by Governor Brown, the decision of whether to exercise eminent domain would still need to be made by Lt. Gov. Gavin Newsom, State Controller John Chiang and State Finance Director Michael Cohen.

Acquisition of an easement on Khosla’s property would allow public access to Martins Beach just a few miles south of Half Moon Bay, a popular spot of surfers. So far, no comments have been made by Newsom and Cohen regarding their decision whether or not to implement the bill. A spokesman for Chiang stated that no decisions by Chiang have been made and he will take a position once all arguments are made and heard from the parties involved.

By: Glenn L. Block, Esq.
To learn more about Glenn L. Block, partner at California Eminent Domain Law Group, visit

Claremont to Vote on Possible Eminent Domain Action Against Private Water Company, 7/15/14

The City of Claremont is turning to its citizens to ascertain whether or not the city should forcefully take possession of the local privately owned water company, Golden State Water Co. The City Council unanimously voted that a $55 million bond measure will be placed on the November ballot relating to acquisition.

As the water company’s rates and prices gradually increased, so did the backlash from the Claremont city residents. Since 2004, prices have increased 100%. Whether or not the city’s proposed acquisition is to benefit the residents with lower bills, however, is unclear. City officials believe so but Golden State Water Co. spokeswoman, Julie Hooper, believes that the city is trying to convince its residence that its appraised value of $55 million is all that the city will spend for the acquisition. She notes that the city is not disclosing the additional costs for borrowing the $55 million nor the interest it will incur.
Furthermore, there is a major discrepancy between the city’s appraised value and the value the water company claims. According to Hopper, Golden State believes that the company is worth close to $135 million. The city refuses to release its appraisal report to Golden State; its offer stands, as of October 2013, at $55 million.

Nevertheless, Hopper has made it clear that the company is willing to work with the city to try to reach a compromise in the hopes that eminent domain proceedings can be avoided. City officials say that they will not be filing the eminent domain lawsuit until after the November vote on the bond measure, so the City Council can get a better idea of the public’s perception towards the takeover.

Richmond, California Has Yet to Exercise Eminent Domain to Seize Underwater Mortgages, 6/30/14

While the city of Richmond is the first municipality to approve the concept of using eminent domain to acquire underwater mortgages, the city has yet to actually do so.

The City Council has been unable to get the needed 5 out of 7 votes to go through with eminent domain proceedings. Therefore, the city is looking to team up with another municipality in hopes that together a joint powers authority will help carry out the proceedings.

Other cities, however, are reluctant to join in. Reasons for the hesitation comes in two major forms; the first being fear of lawsuits and complex litigation from banks and trusts, and the other being the threat of losing support from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).

Other cities take no comfort in the fact that Richmond recently won against the trustees for hundreds of residential mortgage-back securities trusts, mainly because the lawsuits were dismissed without prejudice. This means that after Richmond begins the eminent domain process, the trustees will more than likely file more suits. The potential liability of such lawsuits can carry a very high price tag which deters most cities from joining Richmond’s plan.

Furthermore, the FHFA’s position on using eminent domain for such purpose is another deterrent. The FHFA has made it more than clear it is against the use of eminent domain, arguing that using eminent domain to modify the mortgages would eventually be shouldered by taxpayers. Also, the FHFA fears that it would create credit restrictions for home buyers in the future.

The FHFA is not the only organization against the idea of using eminent domain to seize mortgages. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), the National Association of Realtors, and the American Bankers Association have voiced their opposition as well. The fear is mainly the same; an increase in borrowing costs and restrictions on credit availability.

Richmond says it wants to help its residents come out of the slump that has been affecting many U.S. homeowners since the 2008 housing crisis, but does the city truly have its residents interest at heart? Richmond has been working closely with Mortgage Resolution Partners (MRP), a private investment firm that has been pitching the eminent domain route to numerous cities. The assumption is that if the city does acquire the mortgages, it will turn around and offer the mortgages for a lower price and pocket the interest. Only time will tell what the outcome will be; for now, it is still up in the air. And as the real estate market improves, the ostensible justification for using eminent domain to assist underwater homeowners becomes less and less compelling.

By: A.J. Hazarabedian
To learn more about A.J. Hazarabedian, the managing partner at California Eminent Domain Law Group, visit

San Francisco Bay Commission Suing Feds to Stop Eminent Domain Attempts in Alameda County, 6/25/14

The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission is ready for a gruesome battle with the federal General Service Administration over McKay Avenue in the county of Alameda. The Commission’s decision to challenge GSA’s exercise of eminent domain to acquire McKay Avenue was reached during a closed session meeting held on June 5th.

After the state refused to grant GSA utility easement rights for McKay Ave, GSA filed suit against East Bay Regional Park District back in April. A number of citizens as well as state and local organizations raised enough signatures to get an initiative on the November ballot to rezone as open space the area where developer Tim Lewis Communities is planning to build luxury homes.

The Committee’s reasoning in regards to filing suit is to compel the GSA to show that it’s eminent domain lawsuit against the Park District is allowed under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act. This Act requires federal coastline projects to be consistent with state law.

The advocates for open space are also suing the city of Alameda for allowing rezoning of the area for residential development without complying with the California Environmental Quality Act. Back in 2008, Alameda citizens voted to use the surplus land to expand Crown beach; however, their bid was trumped by the developer’s near $3 million bid.

If successful, the Commission’s efforts will stop the eminent domain proceedings; though, only temporarily.

Updates on the McKay Avenue takeover will be posted on our blog, Facebook and Twitter. For other eminent domain and inverse condemnation issues and projects, please follow us on Twitter and like us on Facebook.

By: A.J. Hazarabedian
To learn more about A.J. Hazarabedian, the managing partner at California Eminent Domain Law Group, visit

Feds Use Eminent Domain to Acquire Public Street for Supposed “Public Use,” 6/3/14

On April 17, the federal government filed a lawsuit against the state of California and the East Bay Regional Park District to acquire McKay Ave in the city of Alameda through the process of eminent domain.

Back in 2008, voters of Alameda passed Measure WW which gave the East Bay Regional Park District authorization to purchase a federally owned parcel of land to expand Crown Memorial State Park. McKay Ave falls within the parcel now owned by East Bay Regional Park District. The street leads up to the Crab Cove Visitor Center and connects with Central Ave.

The DOJ office leading the lawsuit is the Environmental & Natural Resources Division. The federal government’s claimed reason for pursuing acquisition of McKay Ave is to secure continuing operation of the federal building complex which is located on Central Ave. The federal government also stated, however, that acquiring McKay Ave will facilitate the sale of federally owned “surplus land,” to a private housing developer. Currently, McKay Ave is used by the federal government to access the 3.89 acre federally owned parcels and recently a bid was accepted for the sale of that land to a housing developer, Tim Lewis Communities.

The opposition to the sale of the land for residential development and the acquisition of McKay Ave is substantial not only in the Alameda community but by numerous organizations all over California and the nation. State Attorney General Kamala Harris has stepped up to speak for those in opposition to the taking. Her November 7, 2013 letter to the Department of Justice expressed her rebuttals against claims made by the federal government regarding the need for McKay Ave in order to operate the federal complex. She also addressed the State’s willingness to discuss the issues of access or security for the federal complex and her failure to see how a public street and sidewalk could be acquired for “public use,” particularly given that the State is willing to discuss any upgrades to the street that the Feds might desire. However, the federal government is confident it will be able to practice eminent domain over the street.

Recently, a group of 10 organizations opposed to the acquisition posted an open letter to the U.S. Attorney General urging the Department of Justice and the General Service Administration to not proceed with any and all eminent domain cases against California Parkland. The letter described the taking as “not defensible” and a “misuse “of state park property. The opponents to the taking want the land to be left as “open space.” Allowing a developer to build houses on the currently owned federal parcels is “a contrary notion that parklands are trivial…and can be easily undone.”

(The letter is available to view on Alameda Sun Time’s website.)

The elephant in the room is this: Is the federal government using their nearby federal complex as an excuse to proceed with an eminent domain case in order to make money? It seems a bit fishy that the federal government secured a bid for the sale of the 3.89 acre surplus property at the end of the street for a price that was double the parcel’s appraised value, and then went after McKay Ave. Although the federal government is not hiding the sale to the housing developer, it seems quite a coincidence that things have played out as they have.

Now the State of California must file a response to the lawsuit. It will be interesting to see how this case proceeds. One can’t help but to recall the infamous Kelo case and how its decision has influenced governmental acquisition of private properties for sale to private developers.

By: A.J. Hazarabedian
To learn more about A.J. Hazarabedian, the managing partner at California Eminent Domain Law Group, visit

California Town Uses Eminent Domain To Eliminate Private Water Company, 4/10/14

Notwithstanding the public backlash following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Kelo v. City of New London several years back, government agencies are getting more and more creative with stretching reasons to support exercising eminent domain. The city government of Claremont, California is attempting to take over a private water company using eminent domain and justifies its attempts by claiming that the residents are unhappy with their water bills.

Claremont’s “solution” is to take the water company. A municipal utility is nothing new. But taking an already existing private utility is suspect and a potentially flawed plan. The residents are not certain about how the City would go about paying the offer of $55 million to Golden State Water Company and they definitely do not have reassurance that the pricing difference will benefit them. But, putting aside those concerns, there is a bigger issue lurking mischievously in the background. Is it really appropriate for a government agency take a private business away from its owners simply because some customers of the business are allegedly unhappy with their bills?

According to Claremont, they have good reasons for seeking to use eminent domain to replace the private water company. The fact that people are unhappy, however, may not be enough. The rules of eminent domain allow, under the U.S. and California Constitution, for the government to take private property for public use by paying just compensation.

In addition, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1240.030 requires:

The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a proposed project only if all of the following are established:

(a) The public interest and necessity require the project.
(b) The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.
(c) The property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project

While a utility can amount to a public use, here the utility already exists and is privately owned. It is questionable whether Claremont meets the Constitutional “public use” requirements, as well as the requirements of “necessity” set forth in CCP § 1240.030. Moreover, given that the Howard Javis Taxpayers Association estimates the value of the business at $200 million, it is questionable whether the City’s $55 million offer will ultimately amount to just compensation even if the City is allowed to move forward with the taking.

We’ll have to stay tuned to see how this one plays out.

By A.J. Hazarabedian

To learn more about A.J. Hazarabedian, please visit

Elsinore Valley Municipal Water District Prevails in Right to Take Challenge, 4/29/10

By A.J. Hazarabedian

Elsinore Valley Municipal Water District received a favorable verdict in a case involving a right to take action.  Property owner, John O’Doherty was challenging the water district’s right to take a portion of Third Street for a water pumping station.

The verdict was discussed in a recent Press-Enterprise article, “Judge rules in favor of Elsinore Valley water district in eminent domain case.” It appears that the water district did not actually acquire Mr. O’Doherty’s property; rather, the property they did acquire would, according to O’Doherty, “[limit] access to [the] property he owns near Third and Collier, [diminish] the value of the property and [increase] the potential for flooding on the land.”  Mr. O’Doherty sought $768,000 in damages from the water district and challenged their right to use the property.

The result: Riverside County Superior Court Judge Peter L. Spinetta ruled “that the water district had the right to take and use a portion of Third Street near Collier Avenue for the station and that the project was more necessary than the road being used as a footpath or for vehicle traffic.”

As we discuss in our “California Eminent Domain Handbook,” successful challenges to the government’s right to take a particular property are the exception, not the rule, and usually result only in a delay, rather than outright prevention of the government’s right to take.  Each case must be evaluated on its own facts and experienced eminent domain counsel should be consulted.

Condemnation Clauses in Real Estate Agreements: Los Angeles Lawyer, 9/2005

By Glenn L. Block and Robert T. Flick


Certain client instructions should alert counsel to consider taking a different tack. Real estate practitioners must be particularly wary when they hear, “Don’t nit pick the document, just make the deal.” Or, “Forget about the condemnation provision—this property will never be taken.” Wise counsel know that in every real property transaction, it is worthwhile to pause, concentrate and get everything right when it comes to the issue of eminent domain.

As California’s population continues growing and the competition for the use of its real estate becomes keener, cities and other governmental agencies are reaching more frequently for their eminent domain tool. They are doing so as a means to expand their education infrastructure[1], upgrade their economic base through the addition of new retail stores or other projects that generate high revenue and jobs, and mitigate ever-growing transportation woes. The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. New London[2] constitutes icing on the condemnor’s cake and raises the specter of condemnation in virtually all real estate transactions.

While often overlooked, typical condemnation provisions in real estate transactional documents can have unexpected and unintended consequences if an eminent domain proceeding affects the subject property. A real estate agreement cannot prevent a condemnation from occurring, but a little attention paid to the condemnation provisions can provide greater certainty, help to assure desired outcomes, and manage the parties’ expectations in the event of an eminent domain action.

All private property in California is subject to the power of eminent domain—the government’s right to acquire, or take, private property for public use.[3] The power can be exercised by all governmental entities—including cities, counties, school districts, redevelopment agencies, and transportation agencies—and is very difficult to repel. Although it is possible to attack successfully a decision to take private property, most challenges merely delay the inevitable. Compensation usually is the focus for a party whose property is condemned, and a well drafted condemnation clause can ensure that the party is compensated to the extent required by law for the taken property.

The taking entity must pay “just compensation” for the condemned real property, including all interests in the property and improvements to it.[4] A business operated on the property also may be compensated for loss of business goodwill and is entitled to relocation benefits.[5] The property owner in a condemnation action must be “put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken.”[6] Just compensation typically is computed on the basis of the fair market value of the property that is being taken.[7] Fair market value, in turn, is defined as the highest price the property would bring in the open market based on the property’s “highest and best use.”[8]

Although the obligation to pay just compensation in a condemnation action is controlled by California’s Eminent Domain Law,[9] a party’s entitlement to compensation will be affected by the provisions of a condemnation clause in a real estate agreement.[10] Depending on the nature of the agreement, a condemnation provision may:

  • Allocate compensation between or among the parties to the agreement.
  • Maximize the amount of compensation payable.
  • Specify which parties are allowed to participate in the compensation process.
  • Provide assurances—usually in the form of representations and warranties—regarding the threatened or actual existence of an eminent domain proceeding.

Provisions for Common Contracts
A variety of clauses may achieve these objectives. Different approaches may be needed for each of the most common contracts involving real property—leases, purchases and sale contracts, options to purchase, deeds of trust, easements, and covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs).

Leases. Landlords and tenants have separate and distinct interests in real property. In a condemnation action, however, the potential exists for the intermingling of these interests. Practitioners should draft lease condemnation clauses to ensure that the interests of landlords and tenants are separately compensable and that the condemnation award flows to the intended party or parties.

A lease condemnation clause should address:

  • The allocation between landlord and tenant of compensation for “improvements pertaining to the realty.” The Eminent Domain Law uses this term and deems these improvements to be compensable.
  • The allocation between landlord and tenant of compensation for any leasehold bonus value.
  • The rights and obligations of the parties in the event of a partial taking.
  • The allocation between landlord and tenant of compensation for any purchase option that may be contained in the lease.

When the entirety of the property subject to a lease is condemned, the lease terminates, and the tenant’s obligation to pay rent ceases.[11] Nevertheless, the tenant’s entitlement to compensation in the condemnation action survives and is not affected by the lease termination.[12] The condemnation clause, if one is present, generally will control the rights of the parties to compensation in the condemnation action.[13] In the absence of condemnation clause, entitlement to compensation may be determined by examination of other lease provisions, such as those for alteration or termination. Unfortunately for the tenant, however, there is a good chance that a tenant will not be compensation for improvements it owns unless the condemnation clause property provides for compensation for them. In particular, the issues of compensation for improvements and for leasehold bonus value must be addressed specifically in the condemnation provision to avoid unexpected and undesired results for either the landlord or the tenant.

“Improvements pertaining to the realty” is a statutory term of art defined as items installed by any method for use on the real property that cannot be removed without substantial economic loss or causing substantial damage to the property.[14] These items may include buildings, structures, machinery, equipment, furnishings, and fixtures. Improvements pertaining to the realty are compensable notwithstanding the fact that the tenant under the lease may have the right or obligation to remove them upon expiration of the lease.[15] Also, while these items may be considered personal property in the contract between the landlord and the tenant, for purposes of condemnation proceeding they are compensable as party of the realty.[16]

“Improvements pertaining to the realty” may be a meaningful term of art to those who litigate eminent domain but not to those who negotiate leases. In lease condemnation clauses, these improvements generally are referenced by terms that are common in the real estate industry, such as “tenant improvements” or “trade fixtures.” These real estate terms are not mentioned in the Eminent Domain Law, so issues related to whether tenant improvements or trade fixtures are compensable, and who is entitled to compensation, are litigated frequently. These differences in terms are more than semantics. They can have surprising outcomes that can be avoided by simply referring to tenant improvements and trade fixtures in the condemnation clause of the lease as improvements pertaining to the realty and clearly stating which party is entitled to compensation.

Also compensable in a condemnation action is the loss of the right to possess the premises for the rent provided for in the lease during the remaining unexpired term of the lease, including any option terms (whether or not the options have been exercised at the time of commencement of the condemnation action). The value of the lease possessory right often is referred to as the leasehold bonus value and is apportioned from the compensation for the fee interest in the property.[17] A leasehold bonus value claim typically is not negotiated in advance by the parties, but it may entitle the tenant to a significant share of the compensation for the fee and thus lead to an unexpected and severe result. Fortunately for the landlord, a tenant may waive its right compensation for leasehold bonus value, and many condemnation clauses include such a waiver.

The appropriateness of a tenant waiver of leasehold bonus value depends on the nature of the lease. For example, it is not uncommon for long-term ground leases to be subject to a significant leasehold bonus value claim, because the market lease rates often increase over time at a rate that exceeds the rent amounts scheduled in the lease, resulting in the tenant having the right to possess the premises at below market rents. The leasehold bonus value claim in the context of a ground lease may amount to 50 percent, or more, of the compensation awarded for the fee title to the real estate. Given the tenant’s long-term use and possessory expectations, as well as the fact that ground leases usually delegate to the tenant many of the risks of ownership, the tenant’s receipt of some or all of this compensation is not necessarily unfair or unwarranted. IN shorter commercial leases (5 or 10 years), however, the leasehold bonus value claim—which may still amount to several hundred thousand dollars depending on the schedule lease rate and the length of the remaining unexpired term—is less likely to be an appropriate part of the tenant’s expectation. The landlord typically asserts that the landlord, not the tenant, is in the business of owning the property and taking the risks and reaping the rewards associated with that ownership. Accordingly, the landlord should receive all compensation paid for taking of fee title to the property whether arising from increases in market rents or otherwise.

These issues can be addressed as part of a lease’s condemnation clause with the following language:
Any award for the taking or damaging of all or any part of the Premises under the power of eminent domain, or any payment made under the threat of the exercise of such power, shall be the property of the Landlord, except that Tenant shall be entitled to compensation separately awarded to it, if any, for improvements pertaining to the realty owned by Tenant, loss of business goodwill and relocation benefits.

The foregoing clause effects a waiver by the tenant of its leasehold bonus value claim, but preserves the tenant’s entitlement to compensation for its improvements pertaining to the realty.

When only a portion of the property subject to a lease is condemned, it may be appropriate for the lease to be terminated or for the terms of the lease to be modified. Examples of partial takings include the loss of spaces in a parking lot, or the taking of portions of a building or part of an industrial yard, each of which may or may not prevent the tenant from using the premises for the tenant’s intended purposes. If the lease does not address termination upon a partial taking, the Eminent Domain Law leaves the issue up to the judge,[18] specifying that the lease terminates if the court determines “than an essential party of the property…is taken or that the remainder…is no longer suitable for the purposes of the lease.”[19]

The court in a partial taking action may not find in a particular case that an essential party of the property has been taken or that the reminder is no longer suitable for the intended purposes, or the court may make such a finding in a situation in which the landlord or the tenant would prefer that the lease remain in effect, with modifications. Therefore, the possibility of a partial taking should be addressed in the condemnation clause during the negotiation of the lease agreement, when the parties are able to negotiate the circumstances under which a termination, partial termination, or modification of the lease would be appropriate. As alternatives to termination, the condemnation clause may provide the landlord the opportunity to restore, repair, or reconstruct any improvements or otherwise mitigate the impact of the taking to reserve the tenancy and identify specific circumstances or events that would justify the termination of the lease, even if the statutory partial taking termination standard is not met. A well-drafted condemnation provision that addresses partial termination should include a waiver of the parties’ statutory right to terminate the lease if the parties want a different standard to apply.

Purchase and sale contracts. For a typical commercial real estate purchase and sale contract, in which the entire time period from execution of the agreement to closing typically does not exceed 90 days, condemnation is primarily a buyer’s due diligence concern. Although there is no centralized clearinghouse for information regarding potential eminent domain proceedings, there are several steps that practitioners can take on behalf of their buyer (or tenant) clients to gain access to all the available pertinent information:

  • Conduct a review of the preliminary title report to determine if the property is within a redevelopment area. Title reports may or may not show this information. Indeed, title companies may take the position that filed descriptions of redevelopment areas are not party of the public record they are required to search, disclose, and insure. Thus counsel should consider the preliminary report to be only one of the available resources.
  • Round up the usual suspects. Contact local agencies that may be likely condemnors, such as counties, cities, school districts, water districts, Caltrans, and local redevelopment agencies. Inquire about proposed projects, including parks, schools, public facilities, and street and highway expansions or improvements. It may not be practical to contact every conceivable agency, but cities, counties, redevelopment agencies, and school districts are among the most common condemning authorities and should be contacted in each instance. Common sense and a property-specific diligence plan will help determine the appropriate scope of due diligence.
  • Ask the seller to represent and warrant in the purchase and sale agreement whether the seller has been contacted by any governmental agency or other entity regarding the possible acquisition of all or a portion of the property, and whether any governmental agencies or other entities have requested or conducted environmental investigations or appraisal inspections. Governmental bodies generally conduct environmental investigations and appraisal inspections in advance of making a condemnation offer.

The condemnation clause in a purchase and sale contract also should address which party bears the risk of loss—and which party is entitle to the condemnation award if the property is condemned before the transaction is completed. In the absence of a relevant contractual provision, the party who bears the risk of loss at the time of the condemning authority may take possession of the property generally is entitled to the owner’s portion of the award.[20] If neither legal title nor possession has been transferred to the purchaser by the time the condemning authority may take possession, the seller receives the award.[21] The statutory scheme may appear fair at first blush, but it may create an undesirable result for many reasons. The seller and purchaser may agree that the purchaser can enter the property early to make repairs, begin planning, or even commence a work of improvement. If a full or partial condemnation occurred, it would be unexpected and unfair for the purchaser to receive the condemnation proceeds simply by virtue of having an early possession right. Additionally, the parties may desire that payments for partial takings be handled contrary to the statutory protocol, such as by allowing the purchaser to continue with the transaction and receive an assignment of, or credit for, proceeds payable to the seller.

Finally, a condemnation clause in a purchase and sale agreement should provide that the property conveyed includes all actions, causes of action, and all rights to insurance and condemnation proceeds pertaining to the property. This makes certain that the purchaser may participate in and receive any award from a condemnation proceeding, even one that may have commenced before the closing of the purchaser’s acquisition.

Options to purchase. The owner of an unexercised option to purchase real property or improvements possesses a compensable property right in a condemnation action. In the absence of a clause in the option agreement to the contrary, the measure of damages to the optionee is the excess, if any, of the condemnation compensation above the option purchase price.[22] Once again, many option agreements fail to address the possibility of condemnation, and a landowner might be surprised to find a portion of the compensation flowing to the optionee—a situation that could have been prevented by including the optionee’s waiver of compensation in the agreement.

Deeds of trust and financing agreements. The condemnation clause in a deed of trust or other financing agreement should address how the outstanding obligation is to be satisfied, including interest and attorney’s fees, in the event that all or a portion of the collateral is taken by eminent domain. The lienholder generally has a priority interest in the condemnation award to the same extent as it would have a priority interest in the proceeds of a typical sale. Under California law, however, the lender is not entitled to enforce a prepayment penalty provision in a condemnation action.[23]

The lender should become a party to the action, whether or not it is named or served, as a “person” who claims an interest in the condemned property.[24] An adequately collateralized loan usually can be satisfied from the initial deposit of probable compensation that the condemning authority places with the court in order to obtain possession.[25] The lienholder can seek an order in the condemnation proceeding authorizing distribution of the proceeds that are necessary to satisfy the lien.[26] Often, the borrower’s attorney will facilitate satisfaction of these obligations from the deposit to minimize the accrual of interest and to avoid, or at least minimize, the borrower’s obligation for the lienholder’s attorney’s fees. When the borrower is cooperative, the distribution can be accomplished by a stipulated order. The loan documents should include the right of the lienholder to have condemnation proceeds paid to the lienholder, because this will be a necessary allegation to obtain an order.

If the deposit is insufficient to satisfy the outstanding balance or if there are other disputes, the matter may be resolved in a judicial apportionment of the final condemnation award.[27] In unusual circumstances, when a loan is significantly undercollateralized and the borrower walks away from the property, the lienholder actually may choose to be the one to defend the action (in the borrower’s name or otherwise) to seek greater compensation and maximize recovery on its loan. The Eminent Domain Law does not specifically provide this right, so the lender can protect itself by including this right in the deed of trust or financing agreement.

For partial takings in which a significant portion of the property is condemned, impairment of security may also be an issue. Under the Eminent Domain Law, a lienholder is entitled to share in the condemnation award for a partial taking “only to the extent determined by the court to be necessary to prevent an impairment of the security.”[28] This statute applies even if a condemnation clause provides otherwise.[29] The lien will remain on the property not taken. The Eminent Domain Law also addresses the allocation of an award for a partial taking among senior and junior lienholders.[30]

Rather than attempting to deal with the issue of allocation for a partial taking, the deed of trust or financing agreement—or the subordination and intercreditor agreement if there are multiple loans secured by the same property—may be better served by focusing on the use of funds and the effect of the taking on the contractual relationship. Specifically, the parties may prefer to apply the condemnation award for a partial taking to the repair, restoration, or reconstruction of the property and improvements. Alternatively, if the taking exceeds a certain percentage or dollar value, the parties may choose to have the proceeds used to pay down the loan and have the lending relationship terminate.

Easements and CC&Rs. Condemnation clauses are often conspicuously absent from easement agreements or agreements establishing CC&Rs. Easements or CC&Rs should address compensation for the different interests and the rights and obligations of the parties in the event of a taking. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, if the servient tenement is acquired, or the dominant tenement’s interest is otherwise extinguished or damaged, just compensation will be determined as the diminution in the value of the dominant tenement measured before and after the taking.[31]

The characterization of a condemnation provision as boilerplate tends to diminish the attention that parties should be willing to devote to it as they negotiate their real estate agreements. A condemnation clause can materially affect the rights of the parties. By crafting carefully tailored condemnation provisions, practitioners can help their clients avoid unpleasant surprises and unintended consequences from an eminent domain proceeding involving the subject property.


[1] For example, the Los Angeles Unified School District has a plan that calls for the development of a $14 billion campus building program to be completed by 2012, with eminent domain as one of the contemplated acquisition tools. See, e.g., Cara Mia DiMassa, An Education in Expansion, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 2004, at A1.


[2] Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the taking of property by the government from one private party to give to another private party constitutes a “public use” so long as it is done with the hope of creating jobs, increasing tax revenue, or otherwise providing economic stimulation. Justice O’Connor, writing for the dissent, sees the decision as an abandonment of the public use restriction on the government’s eminent domain power, leaving open the possibility that any property may be taken by the government: “Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”


[3] U.S. Const. amend. IV; Cal. Const. art. 1, § 19.


[4] Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1263.010, 1263.205.


[5] Code Civ. Proc. § 1263.510; Gov’t Code §§ 7262 et seq. Generally the rights of a business to compensation for loss of business goodwill and relocation benefits are not directly affected by a condemnation clause.


[6] United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).


[7] Code Civ. Proc. § 1263.310.


[8] Code Civ. Proc. § 1263.320. In certain limited situations, such as property owned by nonprofit organizations and special use property, valuation is computed based on the replacement cost of the taken property. Code Civ. Proc. § 1263.321.


[9] Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1230.010 et seq.


[10] See Code Civ. Proc. § 1265.160; Dix Box Co. v. Stone, 244 Cal. App. 2d 69 (1966) (lease provided that tenant would not share in condemnation award notwithstanding that statutory sharing might have been available); City of Beverly Hills v. Albright, 184 Cal. App. 2d 562 (1960) (lease provision by which tenant divested itself of right to fixtures operated to bar tenant from compensation when the fixtures were taken).


[11] Code Civ. Proc. § 1265.110.


[12] Code Civ. Proc. § 1265.150.


[13] Code Civ. Proc. § 1265.160. See also City of Vista v. Fielder, 13 Cal. 4th 612, 618 (1996) (“[I]f the lease does not provide to the contrary, the rules in question [Eminent Domain Law] apply.”).


[14] Code Civ. Proc. § 1263.205. See also County of San Diego v. Cabrillo Lanes, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 4th 576 (1992) (providing judicial interpretation of § 1263.205).


[15] Code Civ. Proc. § 1263.210.


[16] Concrete Serv. Co. v. California ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 274 Cal. App. 2d 142 (1969).


[17] Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1260.220, 1265.150. At trial, the jury will first determine the amount of compensation to be paid by the condemnor for the taking of the real property. Once the amount of compensation is determined, in the same proceeding the jury will “determine the respective rights of the defendants in and to the amount of compensation awarded and shall apportion the award accordingly.” Code. Civ. Proc. § 1260.220(b).


[18] Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1265.120, 1265.130.


[19] Code Civ. Proc. § 1265.130.


[20] Redevelopment Agency v. Maynard, 244 Cal. App. 2d 260, 265 (1966). See generally Civ. Code § 1662 (Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act).


[21] Brick v. Cazaux, 9 Cal. 2d 549 (1937); County of Santa Clara v. Curtner, 245 Cal. App. 2d 730 (1966).


[22] County of San Diego v. Miller, 13 Cal. 3d 684 (1975).


[23] Code Civ. Proc. § 1265.250.


[24] Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1250.230, 1250.320.


[25] The condemnor must make a deposit of probable compensation, in the amount of its highest appraisal, in order to secure prejudgment possession of the property. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1255.010, 1255.410.


[26] Code Civ. Proc. § 1255.210.


[27] Code Civ. Proc. § 1265.220.


[28] Code Civ. Proc. § 1265.225 (a).


[29] Code Civ. Proc. § 1265.225 (b) & Law Revision Commission cmt. (providing that the lienholder and the borrower may agree “after commencement of the proceeding” to apportion the condemnation proceeds without regard to impairment of security).


[30] Code Civ. Proc. § 1265.230.


[31] Redevelopment Agency v. Tobriner, 153 Cal. App. 3d 367, 372 (1984).


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COPYRIGHT © 2010 Arthur J. Hazarabedian, Esq.